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Abstract
Environmental literature has largely neglected macroeconomic considerations, especially
open economy ones. This paper develops a small country framework that seeks to address
these issues. Medium- and long-run aspects are explored using standard trade and portfolio
balance models, modied to incorporate trade in claims on non-renewable resources (environ-
mental assets). In the medium-run, changes in environmental regulations, saving behavior,
and other variables a¤ect the current account, investment, and composition of output. In the
long-run, both the sectoral intensity of environment use and the structure of the economy are
a¤ected, as are the capital stock and the global distribution of claims on resources.
Department of Economics, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, MA 01003; email: arazmi@econs.umass.edu
1 Introduction and Background
With rising awareness of environmental issues both amongst the general public and academics, relevant
economic issues have come to the forefront in recent years. In attempting to prevent, or at least mitigate,
the e¤ects of global warming, a general consensus in favor of internationally agreed upon cap-and-trade
schemes appears to be forming. The European Union Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS), involving all
27 EU member countries, is perhaps the most prominent instance.
The economics profession has started playing a visible role in the analysis of related welfare and e¢ ciency
issues. Much less attention, however, has been devoted to macroeconomic or economy-wide aspects. Even
lesser e¤ort has been put into analyzing relevant open economy issues. In a future world where some
combination of cap-and-trade schemes are likely to operate at a global level, this is a rather glaring omission.
Consider, for example a world where claims on non-renewable natural resources and emission permits
for their use are internationally traded. For a price-taking small country, changes in the number of permits
issued would likely have a signicant impact on the structure of production and relative prices. Moreover,
the performance on the current account of the balance of payments will alter the volume of net claims that
the countrys residents have on the rest of the world, and hence modify access to internationally traded
claims on non-renewable resources. Furthermore, these considerations will likely interact over time with
changes in other accumulable factors of production to a¤ect the long-run structure of the economy. For, ex-
ample, depending on which sector uses environmental resources more intensively, tightening of environmental
regulations may a¤ect the mix of consumption and investment.
Some recent literature has begun to address aggregate economy-wide issues. For example, a series of
papers starting with Heyes (2000) have incorporated an environmental constraint into the standard closed
economy IS-LM model to study the impact of short-run stabilization policies. This constraint takes the
form of a curve labeled EE, along which the rate of re-generation of the environment exactly o¤sets its
use, leaving the stock of environment available unchanged. This stock is predetermined at any given
point in time and the environment and capital are substitutes in production. Raising the interest rate on
borrowing for physical capital, therefore, encourages substitution towards less capital-intensive but more
environment intensive production methods. Within this framework, Heyes explores the e¤ects of scal and
monetary policies. Decker and Wohar (2012) modify Heyess model by assuming complementarity rather
than substitutability between physical capital and the environment. This reverses the relative roles of scal
and monetary policy. Sim (2006) is another e¤ort that works within a broadly similar framework.
Although the literature cited above has addressed highly pertinent issues, there appears to be something
fundamentally unsatisfactory about the treatment of factor substitution in production. Considering that
the IS-LM model is a short-run xed price framework , it is hard to see how rms could change production
techniques rapidly enough in response to factor price changes. Moreover, the framework used is a single
good one, which leaves one unable to incorporate sectoral di¤erences in environmental resource use or the
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inuence of environmental regulation on inter-sector resource movement.
This paper seeks to provide a sounder long-run footing for the interaction between environment use, rel-
ative prices, and factor substitution. I assume exible prices and full employment of resources. Moreover,
the analysis is carried out in a more generalized open economy context. The real side of the economy has a
Heckscher-Ohlin or Foley-Sidrauski avor,1 and the overall structure of the model is inspired by Dornbusch
(1975). Claims on non-renewable (environmental) resources and on physical capital serve as assets, while
the actual resources and capital are factors of production. Medium-run equilibrium in the goods and asset
markets determines the returns on equity, saving, and investment. The long-run framework consists of a
series of instantaneous equilibria along which asset markets clear. With a constant (exponential) rate of
capital depreciation and limits on environmental permit issuance, savings and investment determine accu-
mulation, holdings of environmental assets, the current account balance, and hence the long-run evolution of
the economy. Convergence to a new steady state involves a net foreign asset position consistent with stable
stocks of capital per worker and claims on environmental resources. The accumulation or decumulation
of assets through saving, accumulation, and international trade in goods and assets generates interesting
feedback e¤ects between ows, stocks, and prices. Specically, it allows us to analyze changes in the produc-
tion structure and emission intensity of the economy. For example, a shift in domestic preferences towards
claims on real capital may create a transitional current account decit, reduce the environment intensity of
production in the traded goods sector, and reduce domestic claims on environmental resources.
In a sense, this paper should be seen as an exercise in futuristic thinking. The world it considers is one
where emission permits are widely used and globally traded.2 Throughout, the focus is on simplicity of
treatment rather than comprehensiveness, and I consistently eschew paraphernalia in favor of conciseness.
The idea is to suggest possible ways to incorporate environmental concerns in a stylized analysis of aggregate
economies rather than modeling a specic economy or carrying out policy experiments in exhaustive detail.
The next section intuitively describes important features of the conceptual framework underlying the
model. Section 3 introduces and analyzes the production side of the multi-sector economy. Section 4
introduces the nancial side of the economy with the stocks of claims on capital (equity) and non-renewable
resources (environmental assets) playing a central role along with money. The real and nancial sides are
combined in order to enable us later to explore the evolution of stocks over time. The penultimate section
then utilizes the combined framework to carry out thought experiments. Section 6 concludes.
2 Conceptual Framework
The model presented in subsequent sections distinguishes between the role of non-renewable resources as
generators of claims on environmental resources (e.g., ownership of oil elds) and as factors of production (in
1See Foley and Sidrauski (1971).
2See Ja¤e et al. (2009) for a detailed discussion of issues related to international emission permit trading in the
future.
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the form of environmental permits for the generation of emissions from the use of oil). To understand the
conceptual underpinnings, visualize a world where a given amount of non-renewable resources is distributed
across countries. Each country thus starts out with a certain endowment of claims on these resources.
International mobility of claims means that these can be traded across countries through capital/nancial
account transactions. It also means that, for a small country, the price of these assets is given by the rest of
the world, which, in turn, allows us to ignore Hotelling rule-related considerations. In other words, countries
can increase or reduce their net claims on the rest of the world through current account imbalances at given
asset prices.3
Next, suppose that each government in our world allows a given amount of these claims to be sold to
producers as emission permits per period. Each permit allows the holder to use up a certain amount of non-
renewable resources, which, in turn, leads to a given amount of emissions. Thus, claims on resources serve
a dual role. First, these act as assets that are traded within and across countries at internationally given
prices. Second, a limited subset of these act as permits, which can be understood as inputs to, or rather
factors of, production.4 Put di¤erently, asset holders are allowed to sell o¤ a stipulated amount of their assets
to producers for use in production. International arbitrage ensures that, ignoring transportation and other
transaction costs, permit prices too are given for small country producers. Notice, however, that while asset
prices are determined by the demand for and supply of non-renewable resources, international permit prices
should in the rst instance depend on the limits that are placed on emissions per period by international
agreements. Thus, while stricter international limits will directly a¤ect permit prices, this may not be the
case for asset prices as long as there is no change in the stock demand for and supply of non-renewable
resources. Asset prices, in other words, may di¤er from permit prices even under international arbitrage
and perfectly competitive conditions. The normalized di¤erence between the price of environmental assets
and that of environmental permits yields the (internationally given) rate of return that holders of these
assets expect to earn. Throughout I assume this di¤erential to be non-negative.
It is important to keep in mind this dual nature of claims on environmental resources. As factors
of production, environmental permits are (imperfect) substitutes for other factors of production (such as
capital). If the relative price of these permits rises, producers switch towards techniques that use non-
renewable resources less intensively (i.e., environmental mitigation). As assets, claims on resources represent
a source of wealth and a substitute for other assets such as money and bonds. The composition of asset
portfolios will, therefore, be inuenced by the relative returns. An increase in the rate of rate of return on
environmental assets, perhaps due to an increase in the international price of environmental permits, will
3A real world example would be the recent spate of agreements that China and India, among others, have signed
with resource rich countries in Africa, giving them claims on oil elds and other commodity generating resources.
These claims constitute the use that Chinese current account surpluses have partly been put to, and may reect
incipient global tendencies.
4As we will see below, insofar as the government re-issues the same amount of permits at the beginning of every
period, these are not actually used up in production, so that it makes sense to treat these as factors of production
rather than intermediate inputs.
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tend to cause a reshu­ ing of portfolios in favor of these assets. While the stock of environmental assets
can endogenously adjust through current account imbalances, the volume of permits issued per period is an
exogenously given policy variable. Moreover, while the former are non-renewable, the latter are renewed
each period.
Market clearing conditions too di¤er between the two roles. As a factor of production, the number of
claims supplied as permits must equal the number of permits demanded and utilized by producers. This
is a ow equilibrium condition. As assets, the stock of claims available must be readily held by investors.
This latter condition constitutes a stock equilibrium.
We can now build on this intuitive discussion to esh out a model in stages, starting with ow consid-
erations before turning to the evolution of stocks.
3 Output and Prices
This section develops the equilibrium conditions for a time period over which available factor endowments are
fully employed but pre-determined. In terms of logical time, it should be seen as the window that determines
instantaneousequilibria, although full employment implies that the time period under analysis be seen as
the medium run rather than the short run. The evolution of factor stocks is the subject of the next section.
Consider a simple multi-sector economy with two factors of production: physical capital (K) and permits
allowing use of the environment (Ep). As discussed in Section 2, the latter factor could be thought of
broadly as a xed number of the total existing claims on non-renewable resources (E) that can be sold to rms
each period for generating emissions in the process of production. National authorities x this number,
making it a policy variable possibly subject to international agreements. Equity or claims on physical
or real capital is non-tradable across countries. The two factors of production along with another non-
tradable intermediate input (N) are used to produce two nal goods: an internationally traded consumption
good (C) and a (non-traded) investment good (K).5 The small country is a price taker in the global market
for the consumption good. The production functions are neoclassical and both goods require environmental
resources and intermediate inputs. We assume, to keep the analysis manageable, that real capital is used
only in the production of the consumption good.
Another look at the treatment of emission permits may be in order here. These permits are treated as
durable factors rather than intermediate inputs that are entirely used up in production. To see why, consider
a periodic allocation of Ep permits by a government. Flexible prices ensure that all permits are employed
during the period. However, environmental resources are not used up in the sense that intermediate inputs
are, since the same number of permits is available all over again for the next period. The only way to
increase (reduce) the national use of environmental resources over the next period is for the authorities to
5The assumption about the non-traded nature of the investment good is made to render the magnitude of investment
determinate.
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establish a di¤erent limit on Ep.
For the purposes of this stylized framework, its best to think of the intermediate input as a public good,
such as transportation infrastructure, provided to producers by policy makers. The intermediate goods are
complements in production so that the unit coe¢ cients of intermediate input use are constant. The public
sector provides this good elastically in response to changing demand conditions. At a given international
price, the price or fee charged for this good is set with the international competitiveness of the traded sector
in mind. An increase in the rental on capital brings forth a proportional decline in the price charged for the
intermediate input. These admittedly sharp simplications serve to communicate the main ideas without
venturing too far aeld in sorting out the intricacies of a general equilibrium framework with more than
two goods. Moreover, by keeping the focus on capital-environment substitutability, these help maintain
comparability between the present framework and the literature cited in Section 1.
Expressing all factor and good prices in terms of the consumption good allows us to state the zero prot
conditions as follows:
aKCrK + aNCqN + aECq

P = 1 (1)
aNKqN + aEKq

P = qK (2)
where rK and qP denote the real rental on physical capital and the relative price of (internationally traded)
emission permits, qN and qK are the relative prices of the intermediate input and the investment good, and
aij represents the amount of intermediate input or factor i required to produce one unit of good j. Next,
using Xj (j = C;K;N) to represent sector outputs, the full employment conditions can be written,
aKCXC = K (3)
aECXC + aEKXK = EP (4)
aNCXC + aNKXK = XN (5)
Di¤erentiating equations (1) and (2), using hats or circumexes to denote rates of proportional change,
applying the envelope theorem, and using ij to denote the cost share of factor i in the production of good
j,6 yields two equations in three relative good and factor prices:
KC r^K + NC q^N + EC q^

P = 0
6For example, EK = qP aEK=qK .
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NK q^N + EK q^

P = q^K
which allows us to solve for the other relative prices in terms of the real rental:
q^N =   1
NC
(KC r^K + EC q^

P ) (6)
q^K =   1
NC
[KCNK r^K + (ECNK   EKNC)q^P ] (7)
The general equilibrium story can be readily explained at this point in intuitive terms. An increase in
the rental on capital puts downward pressure on intermediate input prices due to internationally competitive
conditions in the consumption goods sector (as well as in the other sectors due to inter-sector mobility).
Rising rK also causes substitution in factor use away from capital and towards environmental resources. But
since the output of consumption goods is constrained by the amount of capital available (see equation (3)),
factor substitution away from capital loosens the constraint on this sector, which expands at the expense of
the investment goods sector (see equations (9) and (10) below). Notice, however, that, with a given price
of emission permits, this inter-sectoral re-allocation is possible only if the relative price of investment goods
declines, making it more attractive to produce consumption goods.
To see more explicitly how changes in relative prices help determine the intensity of factor use in each
sector, recall that the use of the intermediate input is rigid (i.e., a^NK = 0 = a^NC). Thus, the only factor
substitution in the consumption goods sector is that between environmental resources and physical capital.
Now dene the elasticity of factor substitution in the standard manner so that C =
a^KC a^EC
q^
P
 r^K . Cost
minimization implies a relationship between changes in factor intensity that can be expressed as follows:7
a^KC =   EC
KC
a^EC
This combined with the denition of C allows us to explicitly express the e¤ects of factor price changes
on factor use:
a^EC = C
KC
1  NC (r^K   q^

P ), a^KC =  C EC
1  NC (r^K   q^

P ) (8)
In words, the emission intensity of production in the consumption goods sector is a (weighted) negative
function of the cost of emissions (i.e., the price of permits) and a positive function of the rental for capital
use.
7The tangency of the isocost line to the unit value isoquant imples that:
rKdaKC + q

P daEC = 0
The expression for a^KC follows.
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Next, di¤erentiating equations (3)-(5), using ij to denote the proportion of factor i employed in the
production of good j,8 making use of the expressions derived in (8), and solving simultaneously allows us to
derive the e¤ects of changes in factor endowments and relative factor prices on sectoral outputs:
X^C = bK + C EC
1  NC (r^K   q^

P ) (9)
X^K =   1
EK
h
EC bK   bEP + ECC(r^K   q^P )i (10)
X^N =
1
EK
h
(NCEK   ECNK) bK + NK bEP i
  C
EK

KC
1  NC NCEK   ECNK

(r^K   q^P ) (11)
Equations (9) - (11) capture the Rybczynski e¤ects of changes in factor stocks on outputs at given
prices. Availability of a larger pool of environmental permits, at given prices, leaves the output of the
internationally traded consumption good una¤ected (the output of this good being restricted by the amount
of capital available). The extra environmental permits are used up by the other sector that requires these
permits, that is, the investment goods sector. As this sector expands, so does the intermediate goods sector
as policy makers react to greater demand for inputs.
An increase in the availability of capital, again at given prices, shifts production towards the good
that uses these as a factor of production, i.e., the consumption good. As this sector now uses up more
environmental permits, the capital goods producing sector shrinks. The impact on the intermediate goods
sector depends on the structure of the economy in terms of factor intensity use. If the expanding consumption
goods sector is intermediate input-intensive relative to the shrinking capital goods sector, the intermediate
goods sector must expand in response to rising demand. Otherwise it contracts.
With factor substitutability, relative factor prices too play a role in determining sectoral output at a
given level of resources. An increase in the relative rental ratio (rK=q^P ) causes factor substitution away
from physical capital and increases the output of the consumption good (since these are constrained by
the amount of capital available). This increase comes at the cost of the investment good sector that loses
emission permits to the consumption goods sector.
Table 1 summarizes these results. I will use them later as we explore the e¤ects of shocks and policy
choices with the help of thought experiments.
8So that, for example, KC = aKCXC=K.
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Table 1: Medium-Run Comparative Statics
X^C X^K X^NbEP > 0 0 > 0 > 0bK > 0 > 0 < 0 ? 0
r^K   q^P > 0 > 0 < 0 ? 0
4 Portfolio Considerations, Asset Market Interactions, and
Long-Run Dynamics
Analyzing in an interesting manner the evolution of variables and their impact on production over longer
periods of time requires that the stocks of capital and environmental assets domestically owned be allowed
to adjust. Our long-run set-up reects a world where individual countries operate under emission caps.
However, a country can trade claims on environmental resources with other countries. Thus, the global
distribution of claims to the use of environmental resources is a key variable of interest in the long-run
analysis. While pre-determined at a point in time, these claims can be accumulated over time through
current account surpluses, or through new resource discoveries (net of the stipulated permit use per period).
The interaction of stocks and ows inuences relative prices, which then a¤ect the sectoral pattern of
production and intensity of environment use.
There are three assets which together constitute wealth (W ): money (M), equity or claims on capital
(K), and internationally traded claims on non-renewable resources, i.e., claims on environmental resources
(E). With a xed exchange rate, the stock of money held by the public is endogenous and the Central
Bank/Sovereign Wealth Fund defends the value of the currency by adjusting its holdings of money and
environmental assets.9 Put di¤erently, the Bank accommodates any changes in demand for money or permits
by o¤setting changes in its balance sheet.10 The total amount of privately held nancial (non-equity) assets
(F = M + E) is, therefore, predetermined, and the composition in terms of individual components largely
irrelevant to our analysis.
The individual asset market clearing conditions are dictated by standard portfolio considerations. Given
perfect competition, the return to holding equity, rK , equals the marginal product of capital, which, in turn,
equals the equilibrium rental on capital services. The expected return to holding environmental assets (rE)
equals the proportional di¤erence between the price of environmental assets (qA) and the price at which
these are expected to be sold to producers as permits (both prices being internationally given and expressed
relative to the internationally determined price of consumption goods). Thus,
9Again, a real world example would be East Asian central banks/sovereign wealth funds using foreign exchange
reserves to purchase claims on oil elds and other primary commodity sources.
10Readers will recognize this as simply a manifestation of the impossible trilemmaor the unholy trinity.
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rE =
qP   qA
qP
= 1  q

A
qP
(12)
Representing real asset quantities (as expressed in terms of the consumption good) by smaller case
letters,11
m = md(rK ; r

E ; w) (13)
e = ed(rK ; r

E ; w) (14)
qKK = k
d(rK ; r

E ; w) (15)
where the partial derivatives are dened in the standard manner so that mdrK , m
d
r
E
, edrK , k
d
r
E
< 0 while
kdrK , e
d
r
E
> 0 and 0 < mdw, b
d
w, k
d
w < 1. Total wealth is the sum of all three assets:
w  m+ e+ qKK = f + qKK (16)
With a xed exchange rate, the equity market equilibrium condition su¢ ces to close the model. We
know from equation (7) that
qK = qK(rK); q
0
K < 0 (17)
The equity market clearing condition can now be used along with equation (17) to determine the returns
on equity, and hence pin down the state of the medium-run (ow) equilibrium described in the previous
section:
qK(rK)K = k
d(rK ; r

E ; w) (18a)
It will be convenient as a transition device toward the long run to solve for rK , after employing the
denition of w,
rK = rK(K; f; r

E ; k
d) (18b)
where rKK ; rKrE > 0 while rKf ; rKkd < 0.
Panel (a) of Figure 1 captures this information. A bit of discussion may help understand the intuition
behind the signs of the partials. A rise in the capital stock or an increase in the returns on permits creates
excess supply of equity (assuming in the standard manner that diversication motives lead to a less than
11From now on, we will normalize qA to unity without loss of generality.
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one-for-one rise in demand for equity as wealth rises). The returns to equity must rise to remove the excess
supply both through the substitution channel (kdrK > 0) and by reducing the value of the capital stock
(q0K < 0). A rise in nancial wealth or a rise in demand for equity, on the other hand, create excess demand
for equity, putting downward pressure on rK .
Accumulation of real capital depends, as we know from the previous section,12 positively on its relative
price and the amount of emission permits available, and negatively on the current level of capital stock and
the rental on capital. Taking into account the rate of capital depreciation, ,
_K = h[qK(rK);K; eP ; q

E ]  K (19a)
which, after substitution from equation (18b) and re-arranging yields
_K = _K(K; f; eP ; k
d; rE) (19b)
with _KeP , _Kf , _Kkd > 0 and _KK , _KrE , < 0. An increase in the returns to holding environmental assets
puts upward pressure on rK , which in turn, by lowering the relative price of investment goods, reduces
accumulation. An increase in the holdings of equity has a similar e¤ect through raising rK but also has
an added direct negative Rybczynski impact on accumulation in addition to increased capital depreciation.
Higher holdings of nancial assets, or increased demand for equity have the opposite e¤ect since these create
demand for equity and thus reduce rK . Finally, greater allowance of environmental permits shifts output
towards investment goods through the Rybczynski channel.
As discussed earlier, environmental assets are accumulated or decumulated through current account
imbalances, which in turn reect saving  (gross) investment imbalances. Put di¤erently, a country can
increase its access to environmental resources by exporting its excess savings to the rest of the world. Using
equation (19b), gross investment can be written,
I = _K + K = I(K; f; eP ; k
d; rE) (20)
where the partials follow from equation (19b). Saving depends positively on the returns to holding equity
or nancial assets and, via the standard Metzler channel,13 negatively on wealth.
S = (rK ; r

E ; w)
Or, substituting from equations (16) and (18b) to derive a more explicit form:
S = S(K; f; kd; rE ; ) (21)
12See equation (10) and Table 1.
13See Metzler (1951).
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with Sf , Skd < 0 and S, SrE > 0. The partial with respect to K is ambiguous in sign. By increasing
wealth, a higher level of equity holding undermines saving. By reducing the value of a given stock of wealth
and by increasing the return on equity, however, an increase in K raises saving. Thus, SK 7 0.
Panel (b) of Figure 1 reects the saving-investment balance as captured by equations (20) and (21). The
gure illustrates a situation where investment equals saving at the prevailing rate of return on equity.
The equation of motion for the net accumulation of environmental assets can now be dened. Total
access to environmental resources is a¤ected by their use in production, by new discoveries, and by net
international purchases. For a given value of eP , a current account surplus allows domestic residents to
increase their net holdings of environmental assets. The net change in environmental assets per period is,
therefore, simply the current account balance plus new discoveries () adjusted for the assets used up as
permits each period.
_e = _f + (   eP ) = (S   I) + (   eP )
= S(K; f; kd; rE ; )  I(K; f; eP ; kd; rE) + (   eP )
= _e(K; f; eP ; k
d; rE ; ; ) (22)
From now on, it will be convenient to use the term net current account surplus or decit for the expression
(S   I) + (   eP ) 7 0. Based on the discussion following equations (20) and (21), the signs of six partials
are unambiguous; _ef , _ekd ; _eeP < 0; _erE > 0, _e = _e = 1. An increase in K reduces investment via the
Rybczynski and capital depreciation e¤ects, as well as by reducing rK , and thus furthers accumulation of
nancial assets but, as noted earlier, has ambiguous e¤ects on saving. The number of channels in favor of
a positive impact on the current account balance makes this result much more plausible, and we will mostly
focus on this case in subsequent analysis.14 It is important to note, however, that our comparative dynamic
results are qualitatively robust to assuming one sign or the other for _eK , as long as the system is locally
stable, a condition which, as shown in the appendix, is unambiguously satised.
Given the long-run nature of this exercise, it may be considered a desirable policy objective that the
stock of environmental resources stabilize in the steady state. Thus, the steady state ( _e = 0) is characterized
by current account imbalances vis-á-vis the rest of the world that exactly o¤set any change in the stock of
environmental resources due to use in production (net of new discoveries). Given the stock of labor, the
steady state rate of physical capital accumulation per worker too must be such so as to stabilize the stock
of capital.
Panels (c) and (d) of Figure 1 illustrate the long-run dynamics of the system based on equations (19b)
and (22). The appendix provides the underlying mathematics. Case 1 (Panel c) assumes that the wealth
14Note that the only negative e¤ect on saving is that of increased wealth on savings (the Metzler channel).
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e¤ect on saving is large enough to overcome the several o¤setting e¤ects, so that _eK < 0. However, for
the reasons discussed above, this is the less likely case and I restrict detailed discussion of the thought
experiments to Case 2 (Panel d).15 The adjustment process can either be monotonic or a half-cycle, but not
oscillatory. Both isoclines are upward-sloping in this case although the _K = 0 isocline is steeper, that is,
the accumulation of physical capital is relatively more sensitive than environmental asset accumulation to
changes in the capital stock. The slopes can be explained intuitively. Higher nancial wealth reduces rK ,
boosts investment and reduces savings, creating a net current account decit. With _eK > 0, the level of the
capital stock must rise to restore current account balance, partly by boosting returns on equity. Moreover,
the increased rate of capital accumulation due to greater nancial wealth requires, again, a rise in K to
make investment less attractive and restore the steady state level of accumulation.
How does the system ensure dynamic stability? In order to understand the nature of the model, consider
an exogenous shock that displaces the economy to point A in Panel (d). At A the level of physical capital
stock is too high for both steady state capital and environmental asset accumulation. A high level of
physical capital is associated with a high rK , low investment and high savings in this case, so that there is
capital decumulation and a net current account surplus (i.e., an increase in the availability of environmental
assets). Since the latter is less sensitive to the falling capital stock, the system arrives at the steady state
level of capital accumulation rst. Beyond this point, continued current account surpluses boost both
environmental asset and physical capital accumulation (equation (19b)) the latter via the reduced cost of
capital as the system approaches its steady state.
In short, our framework consists of a long-run steady state punctuated by a series of instantaneous/medium-
run equilibria. Panels (a) and (b) capture the latter. With stocks predetermined, the steady state level
of rK determines relative prices and the structure of output in the medium run. Over time, accumulation
of capital and net current account imbalances lead to evolution of stocks and the associated changes in the
steady state levels of the variables. Notice that, with the stocks of assets stabilized at their steady state
levels, wealth and asset returns are also constant, as is the structure of the economy in terms of sectoral
output.
5 Thought experiments
This section pursues the logical implications of the framework developed. Table 2 summarizes the results.
5.1 A change in saving behavior
Lets begin with a relatively simple case. Consider the consequences of an increase in the saving function, per-
haps triggered by increased precautionary savings owing to uncertainty regarding future economic prospects.
15As noted earlier, the results are qualitatively the same in both cases so that analyzing case 1 does not add much
to the discussion.
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Figure 1: Graphical representation of the framework
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There is no direct impact on returns to equity or wealth, and hence none on the ow of investment or the
medium-run equilibrium.
Increased savings create a current account surplus in excess of permit use. This surplus then has long-
run repercussions. As domestic agents gain access to environmental assets, rK declines and investment
gets a boost. The economy continues to accumulate claims on both physical capital and environmental
assets culminating in an outcome with higher steady state stocks of both K and e (and thus of f). Figure 2
illustrates the dynamics. The _e = 0 isocline shifts upward as zero steady state accumulation of environmental
assets is now consistent with a greater stock of these at the original level of capital stock.
What are the e¤ects on the structure of the economy and relative prices? Since K and e are both
higher in the new steady state, a rst glance at equation (18b) would suggest that the new steady state
level of returns on equity may be lower or higher. As demonstrated in the appendix, however, rK is
unambiguously lower. This, in turn, means that the intensity of environment use in the consumer goods
sector is also lower. With a higher capital stock and unchanged permit use, the composition of output at
given prices shifts towards consumption goods at the cost of investment goods (see Section 3). Moreover,
in the absence of changes in permit regulations or resource discoveries, the decline in investment must be
matched by a decline in savings in the new steady state, more than neutralizing the initial change in saving
behavior. Note that this decline in savings is consistent with increased wealth. Also, the expansion of
the capital-using consumption goods sector is consistent with capital accumulation with full employment of
resources.
5.2 Fewer new resource discoveries
Next, what happens if the rate of new non-renewable resource discoveries slows down? Again, there is
no direct impact on the state of the medium run. At the initial level of returns to equity, a net current
account decit is created (see Panel (b) of Figure 3). The _e = 0 isocline shifts downwards as a lower level
of wealth and a higher level of rK are now consistent with net current account balance at a given level of
the capital stock. As domestic ownership of environmental assets declines, wealth falls while rK rises. Both
the latter changes help shrink the net current account decit while at the same time starting a process of
capital decumulation.
In the long run, capital decumulation and net current account decits lead to lower stocks of both
environmental assets and equity in the new steady state.
With the new steady state values of both K and e being lower, the e¤ects on the structure of the
economy and relative prices are the mirror image of those resulting from increased savings. Specically, the
new steady state level of returns on equity is higher, resulting in greater intensity of environment use in
the consumption goods sector. At given relative prices, the capital goods sector expands at the expense
of the consumption goods sector. This latter result is reminiscent of the Dutch disease literature, which
14
Figure 2: An increase in the saving function
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often focuses on the negative e¤ects of resource discoveries on manufacturing and investment, although the
transmission mechanisms are di¤erent.
Can policy makers o¤set the impact of dwindling discoveries? One option perhaps could be to subsidize
savings in order to prevent the medium-run impact. In terms of panel (b) of Figure 3, this shifts the SS-
curve down. A second option that prevents the stock of capital from declining is to shift the _K = 0 isocline
up, perhaps through incentives for accelerated capital depreciation. The accompanying increased claims on
environmental assets, moreover, have the side e¤ect of lowering the steady state rental on capital, causing
substitution away from the use of environmental resources, and boosting the production of investment goods
at the expense of the consumption goods sector.
5.3 Shift in preferences towards holding domestic equity
Suppose domestic preferences shift in favor of holding equity. This brings down the return on equity in the
short run as investors are willing to hold equity at a lower level of rK . The rr-curve in panel (a) of Figure 4
shifts down. A net current account decit develops as investment exceeds saving net of permit use at the
now lower level of rK .
Over time, the combination of the net current account decit and higher investment lead to fewer
environmental assets for domestic residents and accumulation of claims on real capital (see panels (c) and
(d) of Figure 4). The most direct (monotonic) path to the new steady state involves continuous current
account decits and capital accumulation. The new steady state stock of capital is higher but domestic
access to environmental assets is more constricted.
Graphically, both isoclines shift downwards but by less so in the case of the _e = 0 isocline. The _e = 0
isocline shifts more in the horizontal direction than the other isocline. Notice that, although a change in
the stock of capital a¤ects capital accumulation, it a¤ects environmental asset accumulation through both
capital accumulation (or investment) and saving.
The new steady state level of rK is higher. Changed steady state values of rK and K have structural
consequences for the economy. Production shifts away from capital goods and towards consumption goods.
Moreover, the intensity of environment use in the latter sector rises. Since the new steady state level of
investment is lower, so is the new steady state level of savings.
5.4 Tighter environmental regulation
Consider the e¤ect of a more limited allowance of environmental permits. Such a development, in turn,
could be due either to a new international agreement or to a unilateral decision to further limit emissions.
The immediate e¤ect is to reduce the output of investment goods via the Rybczynksi channel (see
equation (10)) and to create a net current account surplus. In terms of Panel (b) of Figure 5, the SS-curve
shifts down.
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Figure 3: Fewer resource discoveries
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Figure 4: Shift in domestic portfolio demand toward equity
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Over time, the combination of the current account surplus and lower investment leads to environmental
asset accumulation by domestic agents and decumulation of real capital. Declining K has a dampening
e¤ect on capital decumulation as does the rise in f . The most direct approach to the new steady state (see
Panel c of Figure 5) involves continuous net current account surpluses and capital decumulation and occurs
in the presence of strong Rybczynski e¤ects.16 Both isoclines shift leftward, although the _e = 0 isocline
shifts more. The steady state involves greater access to environmental assets for domestic agents but at the
cost of a lower stock of physical capital.
Panel (d) illustrates the case where the Rybczynski e¤ects are weak. In this case, the initial decline in
investment due to reduced permit use is su¢ ciently small so that the economy continues to have a net current
account surplus when capital decumulation ceases. The resulting continued expansion of environmental asset
ownership that leads to a further decline in rK then results in capital accumulation and the eventual steady
state involves greater stocks of both environmental assets and capital than the initial steady state. Thus, the
most direct path between the steady states is non-monotonic when Rybczynski e¤ects are weak and involves
capital decumulation followed by accumulation along with continuous net current account surpluses.
What are the long-run e¤ects on the goods and factor markets? In the case where the Rybczynski
channel is strong, equation (18b) implies that a higher steady state level of emission permits and lower level
of physical capital stock together exist with a decline in rK and a higher price of capital goods. An increase
in the output of investment goods occurs at the expense of consumption goods. The impact on steady state
savings is ambiguous, and depends on the extent to which the new higher steady state level of investment
compensates for lower emission permit allowance.
Lower rental on capital means that there is substitution in production away from environmental inputs.
How is substitution toward physical capital possible in the presence of full utilization of resources if the
stock of capital in the new steady state is lower? The answer of course is that this is made possible by
the contraction of the capital-using consumption goods sector. The emission intensity of production is now
lower in the consumption goods sector, as is the overall level of emissions created by domestic producers.
Finally, could policy preempt the transitional volatility that accumulation su¤ers in the presence of weak
Rybczysnki e¤ects? An obvious recourse would be to penalize savings in order to dampen the shift of the
_e = 0 isocline, or perhaps to even completely o¤set the initial shift of the SS-curve. Another possibility
would be to take away incentives for new resource discoveries, essentially matching fewer new permits with
fewer new environmental assets. Either course has political-economic implications which we do not pursue
here.
16Note that, unlike earlier gures, Figure 5 does not show the case where the _e = 0 isocline is downward-sloping.
The results are qualitatively identical between the two cases.
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Figure 5: More restricted allowance of environmental permits
Table 2: Long-run thought experiments (e¤ects on steady state values of endogenous variables)
rK S I K e q K X C X K a EC
Rise in σ - -* -* + + + +* -* -
Decline in η + +* +* - - - -* +* +
Rise in k d + - - + - - + - +
Decline in e P ** - ? + - + + - + -
* At given factor prices
** With strong Rybczynski effects
20
6 Concluding remarks
This paper is an attempt to incorporate macroeconomic analysis into environmental economics in order to
study a world where claims on natural resources are traded among countries in the presence of a cap-and-
trade regime. Recognizing the dual nature of claims on environmental resources as assets and factors of
production, I develop a long-run, exible price framework which can be used to explore long-run interactions
between goods, factor, and asset markets. The set-up used is that of a price taking small country where, in
line with previous literature, capital and environmental use are substitutes in production.
In the long run, a country can modify its claims on environmental resources by trading access to these
with the rest of the world. Moreover, factor substitution in response to price signals may change the intensity
of resource use in production. These developments, however, have structural consequences. In our model,
for example, limiting the number of emission permits issued per period could result in shifting the structure
of output from consumer goods to investment goods, in addition to lowering the intensity of environment
use in production. Under certain conditions, however, this generates investment volatility unless countered
by policy actions. A shift in domestic portfolio preferences towards equity is likely to have the opposite
e¤ect on the steady state structure of the economy as well as the steady state composition of asset portfolios.
Moreover, the intensity of environment use rises in the consumption goods sector. Finally, by reducing the
rental on capital, increased precautionary savings could raise the capital intensity of domestic production
and boost the output of the capital-using consumption good while reducing investment.
The work presented here is suggestive. In order to simplify the analysis, we imposed substantial structure
on the economy. Given the externalities involved, one would like to limit emissions across the world, not just
in one country. This would require the analysis of longer-run issues such as technological change. Countries
di¤er in terms of income, degree of industrialization, and resource intensity of production. Production of a
good in a highly industrialized economy may, for example, create less pollution per unit than production of
the same good in a developing country. Future work will focus on these issues and extend the ideas presented
here to analyze aspects related to North-South interactions.
7 Mathematical Appendix
Equations (15), (16), (17) and (18a) yield the following partials:
rKK =   (1 k
d
w)qK

 , rKf =
kdwq

A

 , rKrE
=
kdr
E

 , and rKkd =
1

 , where 
 =
 
1  kdw

q0KK   kdrK <
0.
The determinant of the Jacobian for the long-run dynamic system consisting of equations (19b)
and (22) is given by:
1 =
 _KK _Kf_eK _ef

= WhrK (rKK   qKrKf ) + hK(W + rKf )  [W + (  hrK )rKf ] > 0
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where  = rKrKf+W q
0
KK > 0 captures the e¤ects of rK on savings. Thus, 1 is unambiguously
positive, i.e., the system is locally stable.
Changed saving behavior
The long-run comparative dynamic e¤ects on steady state values are given by:
dK
d
=
  _K _Kf  _e _ef

1
=
hrKrKf
1
> 0
df
d
=
 _KK   _K_eK   _e

1
=  hK + hrKrKK   
1
> 0
drK
d
=   (hK   )
1
rKf < 0
The expressions for the horizontal and vertical shifts of the isoclines in Figure 2 are as follows
(the signs of the shifts are for Case 2 of the text):
@K
@

_K=0
= 0
@K
@

_e=0
=   1
(  hrK ) rKK + W qK   hK
< 0
@f
@

_K=0
= 0
@f
@

_e=0
=   1
(  hrK )rKf + W
> 0
Fewer discoveries of natural resources
The long-run comparative dynamic e¤ects on steady state values are given by:
dK
d
=
  _K _Kf  _e _ef

1
=
hrKrKf
1
> 0
df
d
=
 _KK   _K_eK   _e

1
=  hK + hrKrKK   
1
> 0
drK
d
=   (hK   )
1
rKf < 0
The expressions for the horizontal and vertical shifts of the isoclines in Figure 3 are as follows
(the signs of the shifts are for Case 2 of the text):
@K
@

_K=0
= 0
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< 0
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= 0
@f
@

_e=0
=   1
(  hrK ) rKf + W
> 0
Shift in preferences towards holding domestic equity
The impact e¤ects on the return to equity, investment, and saving are as follows:
From equation (18b):
rKdk =
1 
1  kdW

q0KK   kdrK
< 0
The long-run comparative dynamic e¤ects on steady state values are given by:
dK
dkd
=
  _Kkd _Kf  _fkd _ff

1
=  
WhrKrKdk
1
> 0
df
dkd
=
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1
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drK
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=  W (hK   )
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> 0
The expressions for the horizontal and vertical shifts of the isoclines in Figure 4 are as follows
(the signs of the shifts are for Case 2 of the text):
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Tighter environmental regulation
The long-run comparative dynamic e¤ects on steady state values are given by:
dK
deP
=
  _KeP _Kf  _eeP _ef

1
=  hrKrKf + (rKf + W )heP
1
? 0
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df
deP
=
 _KK   _KeP_eK   _eeP
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The expressions for the horizontal and vertical shifts of the isoclines in Figure 5 are as follows
(the signs of the shifts are for Case 2 of the text):
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